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INTRODUCTION
In Toro Company v. R & R Products Co., I the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit commented that:
While [the] law prohibits a competitor from taking advantage of
another's intellectual property or from palming off its products
as another's, the law does not foreclose a competitor from zero-
ing in on a profitable market segment and offering an alternative
product.2
In order to develop an alternative product with which to pursue a
profitable market segment, it may be necessary to achieve a high
level of compatibility with a product already on the market. How-
ever, the information needed to achieve such compatibility often is
not publicly available. This tends to be the case both where the
objective is to develop and market a product which is compatible or
competitive with another product already on the market, and where
the objective is to develop and market a service, such as third-party
maintenance service, competitive with that of a manufacturer of
products. The question then arises, "How may one develop com-
petitive products and services without violating the competitor's in-
tellectual property rights?" The answer is by proper reverse
engineering and by taking appropriate precautions to guard against
actions which could taint the reverse engineering and development
effort.
Reverse engineering3 is the process of starting with that which
is public and working backwards to divine the information or pro-
cess used to develop a product.4 Successful reverse engineering and
product development requires the participant to identify and under-
stand the applicable bodies of intellectual property law, the subject
matter to which each applies, the rights afforded by each, and their
limitations. It is then necessary to consider the types of procedures
1. 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986).
2. Id. at 1216.
3. Software engineers prefer the term "reverse translation."
4. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
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which should be implemented to avoid infringing conduct and to
minimize the risk that the manner in which sensitive information is
gathered and used will be tainted by unlawful conduct. Two recent
cases serve to illustrate the importance of such procedures.
In E.F Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. ofAmerica,5 the defendant
sought to develop a mobile radio unit to operate compatibly with a
"logic trunked radio system" marketed by the plaintiff. This re-
quired the defendant's mobile radios to contain computer software
functionally compatible with the plaintiff's system. The court held
that while it was permissible for the defendant to reverse engineer
the plaintiff's software for the purpose of developing specifications
for writing its own functionally compatible software, the defendant
had acted improperly by incorporating into its software certain por-
tions of the plaintiff's programs not essential to functional compati-
bility. The result was a preliminary injunction against the
defendant on a finding of copyright infringement.
In Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Helios Sys., Inc.,6 the defendants
sought to produce a board compatible with the plaintiff's computer
work station. During the development effort, the defendants used a
proprietary manual which the arbitrator decided qualified as plain-
tiff's trade secret information. Though the development would
have been lawful if based on legitimate reverse engineering, the arbi-
trator granted a damage award based on the defendant's use of the
proprietary manual to develop the compatible board.
This article will discuss generally the three principal bodies of
state and federal intellectual property law which should be consid-
ered before embarking on a reverse engineering and development
effort and the interplay among them. The article will then review
various procedures to minimize the risk that an otherwise lawful
effort will be tainted by unnecessary illegal conduct. The discussion
begins by identifying the applicable bodies of law and their underly-
ing policies.
APPLICABLE BODIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND
THE UNDERLYING POLICIES
In planning a reverse engineering and development effort, one
should consider principally the federal patent law, the federal copy-
right law (including Chapter 9 of the Copyright Act pertaining to
5. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
6. No. 615078, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1988), reported in 15:2 Computer Law &
Tax Report (1988) (under the title Reverse Engineering Using Trade Secrets Costs Firms Over
$1 Million).
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the protection of semiconductor chip products), and the state law of
trade secrets. The author believes it likely that the protection
granted to trade dress by the Lanham Act 7 will also come to play an
increasingly important role in such cases in the future. While other
bodies of law such as the state law of contract and tortious interfer-
ence with contract (which may form an independent basis for a
claim of unlawful acquisition of proprietary information) and the
federal antitrust laws (which may present a defense to an otherwise
valid claim of infringement) should be considered under some cir-
cumstances, they are beyond the scope of this article.
Patent and Copyright
As a matter of federal constitutional law, Congress is charged
with promoting the progress of science and the useful arts by secur-
ing to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective
writings and discoveries for limited periods of time.' Congress has
done so principally by enacting the patent and copyright laws.9
Both the patent and copyright systems employ uniform standards
to promote invention while at the same time preserving free
competition.10
The limited grants of monopoly under the patent and copy-
right laws are premised principally upon the belief that "[t]he pro-
ductive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society
through the introduction of new products and processes of manu-
facture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased
employment and better lives for our citizens."'1 In furtherance of
this objective, the patent and copyright laws seek to maintain a bal-
ance between an inventor's or author's interest in exploiting the
product of his efforts and society's competing interest in the free
flow of ideas, information and commerce.1 2 The courts have recog-
nized, however, that the public interest is the dominant considera-
7. Lanham Trademark Protection Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
9. The first federal patent and copyright laws were enacted in 1790, Act of Apr. 10,
1790, ch. VII, I Stat. 109. In the 1950's, Congress made a total revision of the nation's patent
laws, Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 35 U.S.C.). See also The Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, tit.
I, 90 Stat. 2541-2602 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III, 98 Stat. 3348 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (Supp. IV 1986)).
10. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964).
11. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
12. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944).
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tion in maintaining this balance.'" Reward to the owner is of
secondary importance. 14
Trade Secret
The broadly stated policies underlying trade secret law are the
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encourage-
ment of invention.' 5 Unlike the patent and copyright laws, how-
ever, trade secret law does not grant a monopoly in the subject
matter. The only protections afforded a trade secret owner are
those against breach of confidence and acquisition by improper
means.16 Thus, trade secret law seeks to accomplish by maintaining
commercial ethics that which the patent and copyright laws seek to
accomplish by their respective grants of limited monopolies. As
with the patent and copyright laws, the dominant consideration un-
derlying trade secret law is the public interest. Reward to the
owner is of secondary importance. 7
Trade Dress
The broadly stated policies underlying trade dress law consti-
tute a sword to assert against false advertising and the infringement
of a trade dress." Similar to Trade Secret law, trade dress law does
not grant a monopoly in the subject matter. Trade dress law does
provide protection if a competitor's product design or packaging is
likely to confuse consumers into thinking the product is produced
by the asserting party.19 Thus, trade dress law seeks to deter uneth-
ical business practices designed to exploit existing packaging for a
13. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
14. Id.
15. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 1974). Although the RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS purports to reject the notion that encouragement of invention is one of the interests
sought to be furthered by trade secret law, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 comment
b (1939) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT], the RESTATEMENT "test" for determining
whether particular information can qualify as a trade secret implicitly recognizes that it is.
See Davidson and DeMay, Application of Trade Secret Law to New Technology - Unwinding
the Tangled Web, 12 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv 579, 582-83 (1986). As the United States
Supreme Court stated in Kewanee, "[t]rade secret law encourages the development and ex-
ploitation of those items of lesser or different invention than might be accorded protection
under the patent laws, but which items still have an important part to play in the technologi-
cal and scientific advancement of the Nation." 416 U.S. at 493.
16. See generally Davidson and DeMay, supra note 15.
17. See Jostens, Inc. v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701 (Minn. 1982),
citing, 1 MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 12.01 (1967).
18. 2 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 27:2, at 344 (2d ed.
1984).
19. See generally Note, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 77 (1982).
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competitor's profit.20
THE SUBJECT MATrER TO WHICH EACH APPLIES
Patent
The subject matter of a patent is "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, ' 21 which fulfills the three statutory
conditions of utility,'2 novelty23 and nonobviousness.24 The statu-
tory subject matter is broad enough to include "anything under the
sun that is made by man,"' 25 but does not include laws of nature,
physical phenomena or abstract ideas.26 If an invention meets the
"rigorous statutory tests" for the issuance of a patent, the patent is
granted.27 Patents fulfilling the statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as described above are called utility patents.28
Protection is also afforded for ornamental characteristics of de-
signs. The design of an object consists of the visual characteristics
or aspects displayed by the object. The protection is for the appear-
ance of the object rather than any functional characteristics.29 A
design and utility patent may be based on the same subject matter.30
The protection afforded a holder of a design patent is extremely
limited because slight changes in the design or ornamental charac-
teristics will easily avoid any claims of the holder.31 Similar to
trade dress, design patents may take on increasing significance in
the future.32
20. See Inwood Laboratories, Inc., et al. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
22. Id.
23. Id § 102.
24. Id § 103.
25. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 (1980).
26. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
27. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 477 (1974).
28. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, U.S. Department of Commerce, p. 200-01
(1987).
29. Id. at 1500-01.
30. Id at 1500-03.
31. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871 Term).("We hold, therefore, that if,
in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving as much attention as a purchaser usually gives, two
designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer,
inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed
by the other.")
32. See L. ZARFAS, DESIGN PATENT PRACTICE: THE EXAMINER'S PERSPECTIVE 13
(1989).
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Copyright
Copyright protection subsists in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device.33 Copyright protection does
not, however, extend to any "idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied."34
Any discussion of what constitutes copyrightable subject mat-
ter inevitably draws upon the United States Supreme Court opinion
in Baker v. Selden, 5 the. source of the "idea/expression dichot-
omy" which is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102. Baker v. Selden has long
stood as the seminal authority on the intellectual boundaries of the
copyright monopoly. Whether characterized as the author's
"method of statement,"36 the "forms... by which the ideas in the
mind of the author are given visible expression,"3s7 or "the author's
tangible expression of his ideas,"38 the controlling principle is that
copyright protection will not extend to the idea itself, but only to
the expression of the idea.
One area in which the copyright laws arguably extend beyond
pure expression to encompass utilitarian products is semiconductor
chips. In 1984, Congress added a new Chapter 9 to the Copyright
Act entitled "Protection of Semiconductor Chip Products."
39
Chapter 9 grants specified exclusive rights to owners of "mask
works," which are defined as series of related images, however fixed
or encoded -
(A) having or representing the predetermined, three-dimen-
sional pattern of metallic, insulating, or semiconductor material
present or removed from the layers of a semiconductor chip
product; and
(B) in which series the relation of the images to one another is
that each image has the pattern of the surface of one form of the
semiconductor chip product. 40
33. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
34. Id. § 102(b).
35. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
36. Id. at 104.
37. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarona, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
38. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954).
39. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. IV 1986).
40. Id § 901(a)(2).
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Trade Secret
Under the common law, "[a] trade secret may consist of any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in ones's business and which gives him an opportunity to gain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."'"
Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a trade secret may subsist in
any information which:
1) is not generally known to and not readily ascertainable by
proper means by those who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and
2) from this, derives independent economic value, actual or
potential.4 2
The subject matter of trade secrets is said to lie somewhere on
a continuum from what is generally known in a field to what has
some degree of uniqueness, although there need not be the degree of
novelty or originality required for patent or copyright protection.4 3
Trade Dress
Historically, trade dress infringement consisted of copying a
product's packaging. However, trade dress in its more modern
sense may refer to the appearance of the product itself.' Trade
dress comprises a complex composite of characteristics ranging
from size and color combinations to texture and graphics arrange-
ments. The term trade dress reflects the overall general impact,
usually visual, but also the complete combination of features associ-
ated with the product's appearance.45
41. RFSTATEMENT § 757 comment b. The RESTATEMENT suggests six factors for
courts to consider in determining whether information qualifies as a trade secret: the extent
to which the information is known outside of the business, the extent of measures taken to
guard the secrecy of the information, the value of the information to the user and competi-
tors, the amount of effort or money expended in developing the information, and the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. Id.
While excluding, from trade secret protection, information which does not meet the "use"
requirement, or which would not qualify under the six-factor test, the RESTATEMENT sepa-
rately affords more limited protection for certain types of non-trade secret, confidential busi-
ness information. See RESTATEMENT § 759 comments b and c. The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs distinguishes trade regulation from tort law and, therefore, does not
contain any provision for trade secrets. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at 1 (1979).
42. UNIF. TRADE SEcRETs AcT, 14 U.L.A. 537, 542 (1980).
43. Jostens, Inc. v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 698 (Minn. 1982), cit-
ing, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
44. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 (10th Cir. 1987).
45. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988). Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., U.S. No. 87-1346 (S. Ct., Feb. 21, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, S. Ct. file). The Supreme Court predicted the blossoming of trade dress pro-
1989]
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A federal cause of action for unprivileged imitation, including
trade dress infringement, is available under section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act.46 A product's trade dress is eligible for protection if it is
so distinctive as to become an unregistered trademark. For a plain-
tiff to prevail in a trade dress action and thus prevent copying of the
appearance of its product, certain requirements must be met. First,
the trade dress must be nonfunctional. Virtually every product is a
combination of functional and non-functional elements. The plain-
tiff must show that the features of the product's trade dress consid-
ered together are not functional. If the feature must be duplicated
to have an equally functional product, then the feature is not enti-
tled to protection. However, if the feature merely provides more
effective marketing, it is entitled to protection.4' Second, the trade
dress must have acquired a secondary meaning. A secondary mean-
ing denotes an association in the mind of the consumer between the
trade dress of a product and a particular producer.4" Finally, there
must be a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the source
of competing products.49
THE RIGHTS AFFORDED BY PATENT, COPYRIGHT, TRADE
SECRET AND TRADE DRESS LAW
Patent
The grant of a patent is a finite statutory monopoly. The pat-
ent system is intended to encourage invention by rewarding the in-
ventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by the patent,
to exclude others from the use of his invention. 0 During that pe-
riod of time, no one else may make, use or sell the patented product
without the authority of the patentee.51 However, in consideration
of the countervailing public policy interest in preserving free com-
petition and the free flow of information,"2 the prerequisites to ob-
taining a patent are strictly observed, and, when a patent does issue,
tection through design patents. Id. (citing W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th
Cir. 1985).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
47. Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1540 (D. Colo.
1986).
48. Int'l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir.
1988), (Thus, a line of greeting cards with a particular distinctive look may qualify for
protection).
49. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d at 517.
50. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
51. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
52. See supra note 12.
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the limitations on its exercise are strictly enforced. 3
One of the prerequisites for obtaining a patent is disclosure.
The patent laws require that a patent application include a full and
clear description of the invention and of the manner and process of
making and using it.54 When a patent is granted, this information
enters the public domain with the expectation that it will stimulate
ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances
in the art.5
In addition, patents themselves are strictly construed. 56 A pat-
ent cannot be used to secure any monopoly beyond that contained
in the patent,57 and control over the product once it leaves the pat-
entee's hands is sharply limited.58 Further, the patent monopoly
may not be used in disregard of the antitrust laws. 9
Copyright
Like a patent, copyright ownership vests in the owner a speci-
fied statutory monopoly. Subject to certain limitations, a copyright
owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies, to display the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work, and to distribute copies of the
copyrighted work to the public.'
The owner of a "mask work" has the exclusive right, subject to
specified limitations, to reproduce the mask work by optical, elec-
tronic or any other means and to import or distribute a semiconduc-
53. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. at 230.
54. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
55. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 481.
56. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942).
57. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v.
G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (Misuse of the monopoly granted by the patent
laws to limit competition is an equitable defense to a claim of infringement).
58. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-52 (1942).
59. Int'l Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 463-64 (1936).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the mak-
ing of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided that: 1) such new copy
or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the program, in conjunction
with a machine, and is used in no other manner; or 2) such new copy or adaptation is for
archival purposes only. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
At least one court has broadly interpreted section 117 to mean that copying "as an
essential step in the utilization of the program in conjunction with a machine" includes copy-
ing it into memory for reverse engineering purposes. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847
F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). See also E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp.
1485, 1501 n.17 (D. Minn. 1985).
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tor chip product in which the mask work is embodied."1 Most
important among those limitations is that it is not an infringement:
1) to reproduce the mask work solely for the purpose of teach-
ing, analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or techniques embod-
ied in the mask work or the circuitry, logic flow, or organization
of components used in the mask work; or
2) for a person who performs such an analysis or evaluation to
incorporate the results of such conduct in a new, original mask
work. 62
In contrast to the patent laws, the standards for obtaining a
copyright monopoly in a work of authorship are relatively easy to
meet. As long as the work is "original" (i.e., not copied from a
preexisting work and containing a modicum of true authorship),
there is no requirement of novelty, usefulness or non-obviousness. 63
Moreover, the copyright laws do not require that either the copy-
righted work or any information pertaining to it be published or
disclosed as a condition of copyright ownership.64
One significant limitation upon the statutory copyright monop-
oly is that copyright ownership of an original work does not fore-
close the independent original authorship of even an identical work
by someone else.65 Another limitation is that copyright subsists
only in expressions of ideas, not in the ideas themselves." Like a
patent owner, a copyright owner may not lawfully use his copyright
ownership to secure for himself any monopoly beyond the strict
boundaries of the conferring statute.67
Trade Secret
Another form of "incentive to invention," '68 trade secret rights
are purely a creature of state law. Trade secret rights arguably are
not "property" rights at all, since the "owner" of a trade secret has
no statutory or common law monopoly in the subject matter. 69 The
only protections afforded a trade secret owner are those against ac-
61. 17 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. IV 1986).
62. Id. § 906.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
64. Id. § 301.
65. Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1977).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
67. F.E.L. Publications v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409 (1982), citing
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); see also Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1970); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 210
(1954).
68. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 (10th Cir. 1987).
69. Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
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quisition by improper means or breach of confidence.70
Public policies favoring competition, the free flow of informa-
tion and employee mobility figure significantly in limiting trade se-
cret rights. Trade secret protection does not foreclose discovery of
the subject matter by fair and honest means, such as by independent
development, accidental disclosure, or reverse engineering (ie.,
starting with that which the trade secret owner makes public, in-
cluding products from which the trade secret may be reverse engi-
neered, and working backwards to divine the information or process
which aided in its development or manufacture).7" Trade secret
rights may be effectively abandoned by disclosure to the public,
such as by the type of disclosure required to obtain a patent.7 2
In addition, courts have recognized that "no restrictions
should fetter an employee's right to apply to his own best advantage
the skills and knowledge acquired by the overall experience of his
previous employment.173  This is so even to the extent that such
knowledge and skill include "techniques which are... ..skillful vari-
ations of general processes known to the particular trade. '74  More-
over, even where a trade secret does exist vis-a-vis the general public
or employees or others to whom it is disclosed in confidence, an
employee who personally developed the information in question
may have an equal right to use or disclose it.75
70. Although the "property view" is said to underlie the protection of trade secrets, I
MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 1.09 (1967), and trade secret rights have been treated as "prop-
erty" rights for certain purposes, see, ag., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)
(trade secrets treated as property for Fifth Amendment due process purposes), a trade secret
"has no property dimension." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 497 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). See also DuPont Power Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) ("The word
property as applied to... trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary
consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good
faith.").
71. See Kewanee v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 475-76; Davidson and DeMay, supra note
15, at 584-85; 1 MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 12.01.
72. Kewanee v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 476.
73. Jim Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Minn. 1980) (quoting
Reed, Roberts Assoc., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593, 386
N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (1976).
74. Id. See also Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 900
(Minn. 1983) (the talent or expertise of employees does not come within the scope of trade
secret protection); Jostens, Inc. v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701-02 (Minn.
1982) (an employee's experience and skills, to the extent derived from generally known
sources, are not considered confidential; a computer programmer, like a real estate sales per-
son, should be able to ply his trade).
75. See Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d
1256, 1263 (5th Cir. 1987); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Eng'g Mechanics Re-
search Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1112 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d
430, 436 (Pa. 1960).
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Trade Dress
Trade dress protection entitles the creator to protection against
a competitor's producing, manufacturing, marketing, advertising,
promoting, offering for sale, selling, or distributing products which
are so similar in appearance as to create a likelihood of confusion
among consumers as to the source of competing products. 6
SUMMARY COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS BETWEEN PATENT,
COPYRIGHT, TRADE SECRET AND TRADE DRESS LAW
Subject Matter
The subject matter of a patent may include "anything under
the sun that is made by man," but may not include laws of nature,
physical phenomena or abstract ideas. The subject matter of a
copyright may include any original work of authorship that is fixed
in a tangible medium, but may not include anything beyond the
expression itself. The subject matter of a trade secret may be virtu-
ally any information which is of value by virtue of not being gener-
ally known, including laws of nature, physical phenomena and ideas
in which no one may own either a patent or copyright monopoly.
The subject matter of trade dress may be any product or the pack-
aging used for a product.
Standards for Obtaining Protection
The standards for obtaining a patent are stringent, requiring
usefulness, novelty and nonobviousness, and demanding disclosure
in return for the grant of a patent. The standards for obtaining a
copyright are relatively easy to meet, requiring only that the au-
thor's expression not be copied from a preexisting work and that the
work reflect a modicum of true authorship. Neither usefulness,
novelty, nonobviousness nor disclosure is required. The standard
for trade secret protection is even easier to meet, requiring no origi-
nality or novelty in the copyright or patent sense at all. Trade se-
cret protection requires merely that the information be of some
independent economic value by virtue of not being generally known
to or readily ascertainable by others and that reasonable efforts be
made to avoid public disclosure. The standard for obtaining trade
dress protection requires a showing that a product's trade dress is so
distinctive as to have become an unregistered trademark.
76. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 (1987).
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Degree of Reward
The reward for making a contribution that rises to the level of
patentability is substantial, but lasts for a relatively short period of
time. The inventor receives a monopoly which forecloses another
from making, using or selling the invention for the specified term of
years, even if independently developed. Thus, once a patent issues,
one cannot lawfully build or market a compatible product unless it
is beyond the valid scope of the patent.
The reward for authoring a copyrighted work (other that a
"mask work," for which the period is somewhat shorter) is a longer
lasting but more limited monopoly. While the author has a monop-
oly on his own fixed expression, the copyright laws leave others free
to create even an identical work of authorship independently and to
make any conceivable use of the ideas expressed or embodied in the
copyrighted work. Thus, one is not foreclosed by copyright law
from creating and marketing a compatible product through his own
independent authorship as long as the means used to obtain the nec-
essary information are not improper.
The reward for developing and maintaining a trade secret may
last forever, but merely protects against misappropriation. Others
are free independently to develop the same information or to derive
it from anything publicly disclosed by the trade secret owner.
Similarly, trade dress protection lasts as long as the product is
marketed, but the protection afforded is much more limited than
that of patent or copyright protection.
CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ADHERENCE TO POLICY
The policies underlying the patent, copyright and trade secret
laws are substantially the same, Le., to encourage innovation while
promoting the free flow of ideas, information and commerce.
Although property rights in the subject matter constitute the princi-
pal incentive to innovation under all three bodies of law, they are
not the primary underlying legal consideration. In light of the pub-
lic policy interests involved, both Congress and the courts have
sought to limit the effect of the patent, copyright and trade secret
laws to minimize the adverse impact on the free flow of ideas, infor-
mation, commerce and fair competition. Thus, public policy favors
the creation of competitive products and services by reverse engi-
neering and independent effort.
Congress has established rigorous standards for obtaining a
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patent,7 7 including the requirement of disclosure as the "quid pro
quo" for the right of exclusion. 7  As to copyright, Congress has
limited the author's monopoly to the bare expression of his ideas79
and has been careful to limit the scope of copyright protection with
respect to articles having intrinsic utilitarian function.8" In addi-
tion, Congress has codified the doctrine of "fair use"8" and, with
respect to "mask works," the doctrine of reverse engineering.8 2
In amending the copyright laws to provide explicit coverage of
computer programs, Congress was sensitive to the concern that
copyright might be construed to extend protection to the methodol-
ogy, or processes adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to
the "writing" expressing his ideas.83 Section 102(b) of the Copy-
right Act was intended, among other things, to make it clear that
the programmer's expression of a computer program is a copyright-
able work, but that the actual processes or methods embodied in the
program are not within the scope of the copyright. 4 The Semicon-
ductor Chip Protection Act of 198485 expressly allowed for both
"fair use" and reverse engineering of the subject matter8 6 and the
preparation by others of new, original works based on the results of
such efforts.87 Although the rights granted under the patent and
copyright laws may not be used to violate the antitrust laws by ex-
panding monopolies, 8 Congress has evinced a willingness to relax
the antitrust laws in the interest of promoting technological ad-
vances and the sharing of new technology. 9
77. Kewanee v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 477-78 (1979).
78. Id.
79. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
80. See id. §§ 101, 113 (1982); NoTEs OF THE COMMrrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Session 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5668.
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. IV 1986).
83. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Session 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5670.
84. Id.
85. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit III, 98 Stat.
3348 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14) (Supp. IV 1986).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. IV 1986).
87. Id., The only case decided to date under the Chip Protection Act is Brooktree Corp.
v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Cal. 1988). In Brooktree, the court
held that where development of the accused chip resulted from reverse engineering, the stan-
dard for infringement was not substantial similarity, but rather substantial identity, and de-
nied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction because reverse engineering was shown
and substantial identity was not.
88. See supra notes 59 and 67.
89. See National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 43014305 (Supp. IV 1986)).
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In the interest of preserving the integrity of the patent and
copyright systems,90 the courts have been cautious to limit the
rights of authors and inventors to the strict confines of the statutory
grants. Recognizing that "it is Congress that has been assigned the
task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be
granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appro-
priate access to their work product",91 judicial policy is to be cir-
cumspect in construing the scope of rights created by legislative
enactment.2 When technological change renders the literal statu-
tory terms ambiguous, they are to be construed in light of their ba-
sic purpose.9 3
In the chart which appears below, the author has attempted to
depict in rough, graphic form the relative requirements of and pro-
RELATIVE RIGHTS IN BALANCE
PATENT
Novelty
Scope _
Duration L
COPYRIGHT
originality [
Scope
Duration
TRADE SECRET
Discovery :
Scope '
Duration
tection granted by the three principal bodies of American intellec-
tual property law. Each is limited in application to its own
respective subject matter, each requires a different level of innova-
tion, and each provides a different scope and duration of protection
against use of the subject matter by others.
It is only by maintaining a proper balance between the rights of
authors, inventors, trade secret owners and the public that the
American system of intellectual property law will serve its intended
90. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 668 (1944).
91. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
92. Id. at 431.
93. Id. at 432, citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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purposes. If the standards for obtaining various types of protection
were increased or the scope of protection reduced, the incentive to
new development and protection against unethical competitive con-
duct would be similarly reduced, and new development would likely
diminish, at least within the United States. If the standards for ob-
taining protection were decreased or the scope of protection in-
creased, the development of competitive products and the
development of new products based on what has gone before would
likely diminish, at least within the United States.
It is this delicate balance of which the United States Supreme
Court spoke in the Sony case, 94 and it is this delicate balance which
underlies this country's technological and commercial ecology and
its ability to compete in the world technology market. It is also this
delicate balance which permits reverse engineering and develop-
ment of compatible and competitive products by activities which
are outside the scope and duration of the limited rights of authors,
inventors and trade secret owners.95
FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE INTERFACE AMONG PATENT,
COPYRIGHT, TRADE DRESS AND TRADE SECRET LAW
Federal Preemption
Although the constitutional grant of power to Congress to pro-
mote the progress of science and the useful arts is not exclusive,96
the patent and copyright laws, like other laws of the United States
enacted pursuant to constitutional authority, are the supreme law of
the land.97 When state law touches upon this area of Congressional
power, the federal policy may not be set aside or its benefits denied
by the state law.98 This is true even if the state law is enacted in the
exercise of otherwise undoubted state power.99 The federal "bene-
fits" which may not be denied under state law include both the
rights conferred upon patent and copyright owners and the rights
conferred upon the public at large by the conditions for obtaining,
and the limitations on, those rights. 1°° The question is not only
whether Congress has expressly preempted a particular area of reg-
ulation, but also whether the operation of the pertinent state law
94. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
95. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., U.S. No. 87-1346 (S. Ct., Feb.
21, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct. file).
96. See infra note 110.
97. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 230.
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under the facts of a given case clashes with federal policy.101
One such policy is that of allowing freedom to use and copy
whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public
domain."°2 For that reason, the Supreme Court recently invali-
dated state "plug molding" statutes that sought to extend "patent-
like" protection to product designs. 103 In Bonito Boats, defendant
copied the plaintiff's hull design for a fiberglass ski boat using a
manufacturing process that was prohibited under a Florida stat-
ute."° The Florida statute prohibited copying of a boat's hull de-
sign by a direct molding process and the subsequent sale of the
boats. Bonito sought damages, injunctive relief and attorney's fees
for the defendant's actions in violation of the Florida molding stat-
ute. Justice O'Connor, writing for the court, rejected the reasoning
of the Florida Supreme Court and held that state molding statutes
are preempted by the federal patent laws."0 5 Therefore, the defend-
ant was free to copy, manufacture and sell the plaintiff's boat hull
design. Any state patent-like protection for ideas deemed unpro-
tectable by federal patent law will not be permitted because of con-
flict with strong federal policy favoring free competition using ideas
that do not merit patent protection.10 6 Thus, a state is not free to
impose its own patent-like restrictions on the free exchange of ideas
except to the extent those ideas may be protected by trade secret
and trade dress.
Patent/Trade Secret Interface
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,"°7 the United States
Supreme Court questioned whether state trade secret protection is
preempted by the federal patent law. 1 8 The court concluded that:
1) trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of
those items of lesser or different invention than might be accorded
101. See, eg., Sears, 376 U.S. at 227-28 ("We granted certiorari to consider whether this
use of a State's law of unfair competition is compatible with the federal patent law.") (em-
phasis added); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
102. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964). At least one
state court has reached a similar conclusion with respect to claims for misappropriation of
information; holding that the Uniform Trade Secrets Act preempts other tort claims based on
other states law. ITT Schadow, Inc. v. Stein, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1348 (D. Minn. 1988).
103. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., U.S. No. 87-1346 (S. Ct., Feb. 21,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct. file).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id
107. Kewanee, 416 U.S. 470.
108. Id. at 472.
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protection under the patent laws, but still have an important part to
play in the technological and scientific advancement of the Nation;
2) trade secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge and the effi-
cient operation of industry; and 3) Congress, by its silence over the
years, had seen the wisdom of allowing the states to enforce trade
secret protection. Thus, the Court held that states should be free to
grant protection to trade secrets. 10 9
In so doing, the court recognized that because the constitu-
tional grant of power to Congress to promote the progress of sci-
ence and the useful arts was not exclusive,110 "[t]he only limitation
on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights,
they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this area
passed by Congress..." The court reasoned that the patent pol-
icy of encouraging invention would not be disturbed by another
form of incentive and that the federal policy requiring that matter
once in the public domain must remain in the public domain was
not incompatible with trade secret protection.11 2
Thus, trade secrets may subsist in patentable, non-patentable
and questionably patentable subject matter. Although the election
to obtain a patent requires disclosure of information which other-
wise might be treated as a trade secret, authorities differ as to
whether this constitutes an effective abandonment of trade secret
rights with respect to such information or merely allows one who
learns of the information as a result of the patent disclosure to use it
with impunity.113
Patent/Copyright Interface
In Mazer v. Stein,"' the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the availability of copyright protection for a work intended
primarily for use as an article of manufacture within the purview of
109. Id. at 493.
110. Id. at 478-79 (citing, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973))
[W]here Congress determines that neither federal protection nor freedom from
restraint is required by the national interest, it is at liberty to stay its hand
entirely. Since state protection would not then conflict with federal action,
total relinquishment of the States' power to grant copyright protection cannot
be inferred. * * * Our primary function is to determine whether, under the
particular circumstances of this particular case, [the state] law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress.
111. Id. at 479.
112. Id. at 484.
113. See 1 MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.06(1) (1967) and authorities cited therein.
114. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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the patent laws and, therefore, possibly patentable as well. Finding
that the works in question (statues intended for use as lamp bases)
were copyrightable as works of art, the Court confronted the inter-
pretative question of whether their intended use as articles of manu-
facture served to bar or invalidate their registration as copyrighted
works. Noting that "[n]either the Copyright Statute nor any other
says that because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted,11 5
the court held that the patentability of statues, fitted as lamp bases
or unfitted, did not bar copyright as works of art. 1 6
The Court's opinion in Mazer v. Stein relied heavily upon the
idea/expression dichotomy as articulated in Baker v. Selden, i e.,
that an idea itself cannot be protected by copyright, but merely the
expression of the idea. Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclu-
sive right to the art disclosed. The Court recognized that "copy-
right protects originality rather than novelty or invention" and that
the pertinent copyright regulations made it clear that artistic arti-
cles are protected in "form but not their mechanical or utilitarian
aspects." The Court found nothing in the copyright laws to suggest
that the use or intended use in industry of an article eligible for
copyright bars or invalidates its registration as a copyrighted work.
The Court would not read such a limitation into the Copyright
Act, 7 but reached this conclusion because of the inherent limita-
tions of copyright coverage. 18
Copyright/Trade Secret Interface
As the Supreme Court noted in Kewanee, "[t]he only limitation
on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights,
they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this area
passed by Congress .... ," It is difficult to apply the Kewanee
analysis to the copyright/trade secret interface, however, because of
the significant differences between patent and copyright law. First,
unlike the patent laws, the objective of the copyright laws is not
115. Id. at 217.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 218.
118. In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954), the court expressly avoided the issue of
whether the grant of a patent or copyright, upon election by an author or patentee, bars a
grant of the other. This may not be significant for purposes of the present discussion, how-
ever, since the court in Mazer was concerned with design patents only; and made it fairly
clear that copyright could not, by definition, overlap the patent laws in other respects. This
seems to preclude election except in cases of ornamental design of an article of manufacture.
Cf 17 U.S.C. § 113 (1982) (Congressional attempt to codify the holding ofMazer v. Stein).
119. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 86.
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disclosure,120 but rather the reduction of ideas to original forms of
expression. 12 1 Second, unlike the patent laws, copyright does not
encompass ideas, but only the form by which they are given expres-
sion. Third, unlike the patent laws, where Congress by its silence is
deemed to have tacitly approved the coexistence of state trade secret
law with the federal patent laws,'2 2 Congress has incorporated an
express preemption section into the Copyright Act. 123 The extent,
if any, to which federal copyright law preempts state trade secret
law as to copyrightable subject matter is not at all clear, and a con-
servative approach would be to assume that both forms of protec-
tion may apply to original works of authorship which meet the
requirements for trade secret protection.
APPLICATION TO COMPUTER PROGRAMS IN PARTICULAR
While the laws of patent, copyright and trade secret are gener-
ally well defined in theory and in their application to mature tech-
nologies, their application to new technologies often requires
further definition on a case-by-case basis. This has been particularly
true with respect to intellectual property components of computer
programs and continues to be an ongoing evolution in that context.
120. The patent law objective of disclosure has been characterized by the United States
Supreme Court as "the quidpro quo of the right to exclude." Id. at 484 (citing, Universal Oil
Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471 (1944).
121. It would have been easier to apply the Kewanee analysis under the copyright laws as
they existed before 1978, since the law required publication for federal copyright monopoly,
while distinguishing protected expression from unprotected ideas. As with the patent laws,
the quid pro quo for federal copyright protection was creativity plus disclosure (although
"disclosure" in the copyright sense of publication was not necessarily the same as "disclo-
sure" in the trade secret sense). Because of the changes brought about by the 1976 Act,
however, the analysis under present law differs; no longer requiring publication as a condition
to federal copyright protection.
122. "Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the wisdom of allowing the
States to enforce trade secret protection. Until Congress takes affirmative action to the con-
trary, States should be free to grant protection to trade secrets." Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 493.
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982):
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified in
section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sec-
tions 102 and 103. . .whether published or unpublished, are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes or any
State.
This preemption does not, however, operate to limit state law rights or remedies regarding
subject matter outside the scope of copyrightable subject matter as defined in section 102 and
103; or activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclu-
sive rights within the general scope of copyright. Id. at § 301(b).
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Although it is not the intention of this article to track that evolu-
tion, predict its future course or pontificate on the wisdom of indi-
vidual decisions, this section will summarily review the manner in
which some courts have applied patent, copyright and trade secret
principles to computer programs.
Patent
The Patent and Trademark Office recognizes several "signifi-
cant points of law" from the United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Diamond v. Diehr. 124 With respect to the ex-
amination of patent applications involving computer programs to
determine whether the claimed invention is patentable subject
matter:
1. The "claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropri-
ate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to
ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.... The
'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of the pro-
cess itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject
matter of the claim falls within the [Section] 101 categories of
possible patentable subject matter" (emphasis added).
2. "When a claim containing a mathematical formula imple-
ments or applies that formula in a structure or process which,
when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the
patent laws were designed to protect (eg., transforming or reduc-
ing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies
the requirements of § 101."
3. "When a claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific
principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made
into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that
formula in the abstract." (If the claim does seek protection for
such a mathematical formula, it would be non-statutory under 35
U.S.C. § 101).
4. "A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protec-
tion of our patent laws... and this principle cannot be circum-
vented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a
particular technological environment.... Similarly, insignificant
post solution activity will not transform an unpatentable princi-
ple into a patentable process."
5. When a claim as in Parker v. Flook, 198 USPQ 193 (1978), is
drawn "to a method for computing an 'alarm limit' (which) is
simply a number," the claim is non-statutory under 35 U.S.C.
124. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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§ 101 because Flook "sought to protect a formula for computing
this number."
6. "It is now commonplace that an application of a law of na-
ture or mathematical formula to a known structure or process
may well be deserving of patent protection."' 1
25
Processes employing computer programs have been held to
represent patentable subject matter. These processes include a com-
puter-controlled process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber
into cured precision products;12 6 a program for converting a com-
puter from a sequential processor (one dependent on the order in
which it receives program steps) to a nonsequential processor;1 27
and a data processing methodology for managing cash management
accounts. 128
If an invention employing or embodied in a computer program
qualifies under the above standard as patentable subject matter and
meets the requisite standards of utility, novelty and nonobviousness,
and if the inventor is willing to make the requisite disclosure, a pat-
ent may be granted. Once granted, the inventor has the right to
exclude others from making, using or selling the invention for the
specified period of years in return for the quidpro quo of disclosure.
This right to exclude is valid regardless of whether the form in
which the program itself is expressed is copyrighted or copyright-
able or whether pertinent information not required to be disclosed
as a condition of the patent is a trade secret of the inventor.
Once granted, the patent will be strictly construed and the lim-
itations on its exercise strictly enforced. The requisite description of
the invention and the manner and process of making and using it
will enter the public domain with the expectation that it will stimu-
late ideas and the eventual development of further significant ad-
vances of the art.1 29 The patent cannot be used to secure any
monopoly beyond that contained in the patent. 3 '
Trade Secret
"Information" concerning computer programs, including
125. U.S. DErr. OF COMMERCE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure 2100-2 (5th ed. 1983).
126. Diamond, 450 U.S. 175.
127. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
128. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merril, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
129. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., U.S. No. 87-1346 (S. Ct., Feb. 21,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct. file).
130. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, con-
cepts, principles, and discoveries, may qualify as a trade secret if it
meets the requisite common law or Uniform Trade Secrets Act
standards for trade secret protection. 131 This is so regardless of
whether the subject matter of the trade secret is patentable 132 and
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated
or embodied. 133  Thus, courts have held that unique principles, en-
gineering, logic and coherence in computer programs may be ac-
corded trade secret status.' 34  Even generally known computer
elements may gain trade secret protection by the nature of their
combination, 135 but information or program elements which can be
easily, properly ascertained or independently duplicated by others
may not.'3 6
Although trade secret protection may continue in perpetuity, it
may also enter the public domain upon accidental or deliberate dis-
closure by the trade secret owner 3 7 or upon the grant of a patent
requiring disclosure of the subject information.3 8 Information dis-
closed and products marketed without valid restriction by the trade
secret owner are fair game for reverse engineering by others. 139 The
information may also be subject to independent development by
131. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
132. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
133. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
134. Jostens Inc. v. Natl Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 698 (Minn. 1982), citing,
Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
135. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 699, citing, Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield,
203 U.S.P.Q. 1020 (1977), Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Eng'g Mechanics Re-
search Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975), and Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn.
509, 144 A.2d 306 (1958).
136. See Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 699 (mere assertion that a trade secret resides in some
combination of otherwise known data is not sufficient); see also Dental Office Computer Sys.,
Inc. v. Glutting, slip op., No. 88818 (Mich. Ct. App., Aug. 13, 1987), where the court
comments:
The ease or difficulty with which the information could be independently,
properly duplicated by others is an important factor in determining whether
there is a trade secret. To hold otherwise would be to convert trade secrets into
a bizarre sort of copyright or patent in which the first person to write software
in particular area would have a right to stop all others from writing software in
that area. * * * [The fact that a party] considered his fie definitions, program
specifications and modular structure to be confidential ... does not mean that
they were trade secrets.
137. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974), 416 U.S. at 476.
138. Id. at 481.
139. Id. at 476. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that copying of a program into memory by the "owner of a copy" for reverse
engineering purposes is authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1982)); E.F. Johnson Co. v.
Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1501 n.17 (D. Minn. 1985) (suggesting that dump-
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others who might not treat it as a trade secret, 'I or it may be sub-
ject to use or disclosure by employees of the trade secret owner who
participated in the development of the information if not restricted
by their employment contracts.1 41 Such is the treatment which fed-
eral policy requires be accorded "those items of lesser or different
invention than might be accorded protection under the patent laws,
but which items still have an important part to play in the techno-
logical and scientific advancement of the Nation." 42
Copyright
Computer programs are copyrightable subject matter. The
Copyright Act defines a computer program as "a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result." '43 The courts have recog-
nized that copyright coverage of computer programs may encom-
pass not only the literal, human-readable source code of application
software,144 but also object code, 145 operating system software, 146
firmware 1 4 7 and microcode.14  The United States Copyright Office
has recognized that the copyright in a computer program encom-
passes not only original authorship in the program itself, but also
the protectable expression in the screen displays generated by the
program. 49 Copyright protection may be given even if the program
ing, flow charting, and analyzing a copyrighted program and converting the scheme into
original code would not give rise to a claim of infringement).
Note, however, that neither Vault nor Uniden involved an enforceable license agreement.
Compare SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
While patent and copyright owners may not use their patents or copyrights, to expand their
monopolies beyond the strict boundaries of the conferring statutes, see supra, notes 57 and 67,
this does not mean that pertinent trade secret information cannot be separately licensed
under a valid trade secret license agreement without losing its trade secret status. See
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475.
140. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476.
141. See Structural Dynamics, 401 F. Supp. at 1112; Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v.
Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1263 (5th Cir. 1987); Wexler v. Green-
berg, 160 A.2d 430, 436 (Pa. 1960).
142. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 493.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
144. Stem Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
145. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., No. 1409 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989) (LEXIS, GenFed
library, Dist. File) (N.D. Cal. 1989).
149. Notice of Copyright Decision: Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays,
Copyright Office: Docket No. 87-4 (1988).
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embodies or is part of a patentable process' 50 and regardless of
whether information pertaining to the program may be protected as
a trade secret of the author. 5 ' Subject only to the limitations of
the Copyright Act itself, an author who avails himself of copyright
protection will have the right for the term of years specified by the
Copyright Act to exclude others from the unauthorized copying,
distribution or display of the program or the preparation of deriva-
tive works based upon it.
Beyond the literal, line-by-line code of a program and the pro-
tectable expression in any display which the program produces, the
purview of the author's copyright is uncertain,"5 2 the most pressing
issue being the line of demarcation between the "idea" and the "ex-
pression" of a computer program. The answer to this question af-
fects such things as the scope of the author's monopoly in various
aspects of the program, the ability of the author's employees to ex-
ploit their own skills and abilities in other employment, the ability
of others to produce compatible products and to use ideas, informa-
tion and methods of operation which can be derived from existing
products to develop compatible products, competitive products and
improved technology, and the extent to which the federal copyright
laws preempt state law including trade secret law.
In consideration of the public policy interests involved, Con-
gress and the courts traditionally have endeavored to limit the ap-
plication of copyright so as to exclude the utilitarian aspects of
works of authorship. This has been particularly true with respect to
the design components of useful articles. Thus, for example, the
design of a machine or utilitarian object will not itself be eligible for
copyright, although drawings showing the design generally will
be.'53  The holding in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University
150. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 210 (1954).
151. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
152. For a comprehensive overview of recent cases see Golberg, Copyright Protection for
Computer Software: A Summary of Authorities, with an Emphasis on Current Judicial Devel-
opments, PLI COMPUTER LAW CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (May 9, 1989); see
also Davis, "What Hath CoNTu Wrought?" How Computer Software Copyright Cases
"Look & Feel" - Eight Years After The CoNTU Report,", ALI/ABA 7th Annual New
England Computer Law Inst. (May 14-15, 1987), reprinted in ALI/ABA 9th Annual Com-
puter Law Inst., Practicing Law Inst. (Oct. 29-31, 1987). Davis, Reaching the Limits of Copy-
right" Protecting Programming Languages, Macros, Formats, and Computer Hardware under
the Copyright Laws, PLI COMPUTER LAW CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (May 9,
1989).
153. See 1 MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.06(A)(4), citing, Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591
F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (shape of lighting fixture); Boeing Co. v. Sieracin Corp., 1987-1
Trade Cases 567, 572 (Wash. 1987) (drawing of aircraft cockpit windows and information
contained therein).
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Computing Co. 154 that computer program input formats were ideas,
not expressions, and thus were beyond the scope of copyright,
seems consistent with the traditional approach.
The issue is more difficult, however, in cases where the line of
demarcation between ideas embodied or reflected in computer pro-
grams and the expressions of those ideas are unclear. In Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. "5s the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted the following test:
If other programs can be written or created which perform the
same function ... then the program is an expression of the idea
and hence copyrightable. In essence, this enquiry is no different
than that made to determine whether the expression and idea
have merged, which has been stated to occur where there are no
or few other ways of expressing a particular idea.' 56
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., ' 5
7
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that "copyright protection
of computer programs may extend beyond the programs' literal
code to their structure, sequence, and organization ... ."1s8 Dis-
counting the notion that copyright protection is not available for
ideas, program logic, algorithms, systems, methods, concepts or lay-
outs, 1 59 the circuit court adopted the trial court's conclusion that
the "expression of the idea' in a software computer program is the
manner in which the program operates, controls and regulates the
computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlat-
ing, and producing useful information... ."I' While the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has "decline[d] to embrace Whelan,"1 61 it
is not clear whether it did so because of a fundamental intellectual
154. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
155. 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
156. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253, citing, the
CONTU report, and Freedman v. Grolier Enters., Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. 476, 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) ([C]opyright protection will not be given to a form of expression necessarily dictated by
the underlying subject matter.").
157. 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986).
158. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Labs., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3rd Cir. 1986). See
also SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (cited
in Whelan for the proposition that a program's copyright could extend beyond its literal
elements, to its structure and organization).
159. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1242 n.38 (discussing Copyright Office Circular). Compare
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 210, 211-13, 218 (discussing construction by Copyright Office as
reflected in its regulations); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 801-03 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
160. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239.
161. Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256,
1262 (5th Cir. 1987).
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disagreement with the holding in 1Whelan 162 or merely because it
believes that the sequence and organization of computer programs
may be "ideas" and not "expression" if determined by external fac-
tors. 63 The Whelan decision has been the source of much discus-
sion and debate as to where the "idea/expression" boundary should
be drawn.
The holding of Whelan is easier to reconcile with other deci-
sions than is the dictum. For example, in SAS Institute, Inc. v. S &
H Computer Systems, Inc.,"' the court similarly held that copying
the organizational and structural details of a program constituted
infringement where the resulting program was essentially a transla-
tion of the original work. In its opinion, the court described the
procedure for writing a computer program as follows:
Beginning with a broad and general statement of the overall pur-
pose of the program, the author must decide how to break the
assigned task into smaller tasks, each of which must in turn be
broken down into successively smaller and more detailed tasks.
At the lowest level the detailed tasks are then programmed in
source code. At every level, the process is characterized by
choice, often made arbitrarily, and only occasionally dictated by
necessity.
165
In E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America,166 where the court
found substantial likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail on its
claim of copyright infringement involving software for a trunked
mobile radio system, the court quoted the foregoing language from
SAS and continued by stating:
Obviously, at some point in the process the idea or "broad and
general statement of the overall purpose" of the program merges
into the expression, the "smaller and more detailed tasks" neces-
sary to carry out that idea. The Court need not pinpoint the
exact line of demarcation in this case, however, inasmuch as the
162. One could use the ratio decidendi of Whelan to argue, for example, that the struc-
ture, sequence and organization of a program may be expressed in any number of ways, such
as: logic diagrams, flow charts, narrative descriptions, or implementation in the writing of
the code itself. While there may be a variety of ways, to design a program to perform a
particular function, there are, also, numerous ways to express a given design. This suggests
that the design is the idea, and the program in which the design is embodied is but one
possible expression of it - L e., a particular method of communicating the idea to the com-
puter which will perform the functions intended by the programmer.
163. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1262. This view would seem consistent with the Third
Circuit's discussion in Apple Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, see supra note 156. See also discus-
sion in E.F. Johnson v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. at 1500-03 (D. Minn. 1985).
164. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
165. Id. at 825.
166. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
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evidence establishes and the Court finds that more than one or a
few ways of achieving compatibility existed. While defendant
may have permissibly dumped, flow charted, and analyzed plain-
tiff's code, it could not permissibly copy it.167
Although the court in .F Johnson did not specifically mention
"reverse engineering" of programs per se, it made the following sig-
nificant observation:
The mere fact that defendant's engineers dumped, flow
charted, and analyzed plaintiff's code does not, in and of itself,
establish pirating.... Had Uniden contented itself with survey-
ing the general outline of the EJF program, thereafter converting
the scheme into detailed code through its own imagination, crea-
tivity, and independent thought, a claim of infringement would
not have arisen.
168
More recently, in NEC Corporation v. Intel Corporation,69 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
denied a claim of copyright infringement where the defendant had,
among other things, reverse engineered the plaintiff's computer
programs (in this case, microcode) and used information derived
through that process to develop compatible microcode. The court
recognized that it was permissible for the defendant to disassemble
plaintiff's microcode and to use information and ideas derived
through that process in developing its own microcode. Because
there was some similarity between portions of plaintiff's microcode
and portions of the defendant's microcode, the court considered
both the qualitative importance of the substantially similar code
and whether the substantially similar portions resulted from imper-
missible copying of the plaintiff's code.
Judge Gray's opinion in the NEC case should be studied thor-
oughly by anyone seriously interested in reverse engineering and de-
velopment of compatible or competitive computer programs.1 70
For present purposes, the following aspects of the decision are
noteworthy:
1. The court seemed untroubled by any copying or prepa-
ration of derivative works that took place in the course of the
reverse engineering process;
167. Id. at 1502 n.17.
168. Id. at 1501 n.17. See also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261
(5th Cir. 1988) (holding that copying of a program into memory by the "owner of a copy",
for reverse engineering purposes, is expressly authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1982)).
169. No. 1409 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
170. See Casenote, NEC v. Intel A Brief Synopsis, 5 S. C. COMPUTER & HIGH TECH
L.L (this issue) for an overview of the case.
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2. The court was satisfied that substantially similar por-
tions of code developed through the use of proper "clean room"
procedures171 were "independently created" and therefore not
infringing;
3. The court found that substantial similarity between pro-
tected expression in the plaintiff's code and intermediate versions
of the defendant's code did not support a claim of copyright in-
fringement where the defendant's final product did not reflect
such similarity;
4. The court's opinion suggests that whether an accused
work is a derivative work "based upon one or more preexisting
works" 172 is to be determined not in a causative sense, but
rather by comparing the final version of the accused work to the
preexisting work; and
5. The court held that it was not an infringement for the
defendant to use aspects of the plaintiff's code which were man-
dated by functional constraints.
Neither Judge MacLaughlin in E.. Johnson nor Judge Gray in
NEC explained why copying and the preparation of derivative
works in the course of the reverse engineering process do not consti-
tute copyright infringement and thus the use of "improper means"
to acquire the information used in developing a new, compatible or
competitive product. While the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has held that such copying is a statutory right of
the owner of a copy, 173 this author believes it more likely that such
copying is a form of "fair use" authorized by the Copyright Act 74
under the "equitable rule of reason" standard engrafted upon the
"fair use" exception by the United States Supreme Court.'75 The
courts do not seem troubled by such copying where the objective is
to produce an end product which is not itself an infringing copy or
derivative work. 176 Thus, it appears from well-reasoned decisions
that, consistent with the public policies underlying the intellectual
property laws and absent an enforceable contract limiting the use of
an authorized copy of a program, reverse engineering of computer
programs is fair game.
Another important area in which the law of copyright pertain-
ing to computer programs continues to evolve is the area of screen
171. See infra at p.4 3 2 .
172. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
173. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988).
174. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
175. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
176. But see Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q.
450 (D. Idaho 1983).
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displays and user interfaces. The early cases decided in this area
suggested that courts might be liberal in granting protection to what
some consider to be either utilitarian aspects of such displays and
interfaces or elements of them that can be expressed in only one or a
few ways. 177 The more recent cases, however, suggest that courts
are beginning to be more careful to focus on only the protected ex-
pression in making their substantial similarity comparisons for
copyright purposes.1 78
At the same time, trade dress claims and design patent claims
will undoubtedly further complicate the area of screen display and
user interface similarity in ways which are not yet clear. The pend-
ing Apple and Lotus cases may shed further light on the subject. In
the meantime, the prudent developer of competitive products may
wish to avoid substantial similarity in these respects if it is practical
to do so and if it is desirable to avoid litigation in an uncertain area.
SUGGESTED PROCEDURES FOR REVERSE ENGINEERING AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPATIBLE AND COMPETITIVE
PRODUCTS
Identification of Goals and Sources of Information
As in any development project, it is helpful to begin by formu-
lating a specific written statement of the goals to be accomplished
by the development effort. This should include identification of the
specific hardware, software, documentation and operational capa-
bilities required to produce the desired product or service. It is also
advisable to identify existing sources of such hardware, software
and documentation, and, to the extent not available for purchase
through proper channels, to identify potential sources of the infor-
mation needed to independently develop the equivalent.
Acquisition by Proper Means
It is extremely important to ensure that all information used in
developing competitive and compatible products and services is ac-
quired by proper means. Even though a hardware or software
product may be susceptible to reverse engineering, one may still be
in violation of the competitor's proprietary rights if the product it-
177. See Digital Comm. Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 1987 Copyright Deci-
sions 26,088 (N.D. GA 1987); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 1986 Copy-
right Decisions 26,008 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
178. See Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., No. N-85-253 (D. Conn.,
filed January 30, 1989); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988);
NEC, No. 1409 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
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self is improperly acquired, 17 9 or if the information used is acquired
through breach of a common law, statutory or contractual duty of
confidence.18 0
Although it may be permissible for an "owner of a copy" of a
computer program to copy it into memory for reverse engineering
purposes, it may not be permissible to do so if the copy is acquired
under an enforceable license agreement which effectively prohibits
reverse engineering.'' Similarly, while it might be permissible to
utilize information disclosed through an issued U.S. patent or a for-
eign patent or patent application, it may be deemed trade secret
misappropriation to utilize the same information obtained from an
employee or licensee of the competitor, even though the informa-
tion would have been readily ascertainable by reference to the pat-
ent filings. 182
Avoid Tainting the Process
Relative to the foregoing, it may be appropriate to identify and
review pertinent contracts, including employment agreements, cus-
tomer contracts, distributor agreements, etc., which set forth the
terms by which the competitor sells or licenses its products and
which evidence measures taken by the competitor to maintain se-
crecy of the pertinent information. It may also be appropriate to
conduct an independent investigation into measures taken by the
competitor to treat pertinent information as a trade secret. In this
regard, it is worth noting that the mere placement of confidentiality
or "trade secret" notices on materials does not automatically qual-
ify them as trade secrets if reasonable precautions are not otherwise
taken to preserve secrecy.
Caution should be exercised with respect to the employment
of, or acquisition of information from, any former employee of the
competitor or other person (such as a consultant or customer) who
may have been in a confidential relationship with the competitor or
179. See Technician Data Systems v. Curtis 1000, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. 286 (Del. Ch.
1984).
180. See, eg., Telerate Systems, Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Sun
Microsystems, Inc. v. Helios Systems, Inc., No. 615078, Santa Clara County, CA Super. Ct.
(reported in Computer & Tax Law Report, Vol. 15, No. 2, Sept. 1988, under the title "Reverse
Engineering Using Trade Secrets Costs Firms Over $1 Million.").
181. Compare Vault Corporation v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988)
with SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn.
1985).
182. See 1 MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.06[1] (Mathew Bender 1987).
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who may have entered into a non-competition agreement with the
competitor.
The goal is to ensure that the development process does not
involve any act or the use of any information which would consti-
tute an infringement or breach of the competitor's valid intellectual
property or contract rights. It is advisable not to make any use or
be in possession of any of the competitor's hardware, software, doc-
umentation or information if the specific manner of acquisition is in
doubt.
With regard to copyrightable subject matter, it is important to
note that such materials may be subject to both copyright and trade
secret protection. The mere absence of a copyright notice does not
necessarily mean that the material is not protected by copyright.
"Clean Room" Procedures
Once the necessary goals have been defined and the necessary
information obtained, the development of copyrightable material
should proceed independent of, and without access to, the underly-
ing work.
Using a procedure known as a "clean room" technique as ap-
plied to software development, one team of analysts or program-
mers analyzes or "reverse engineers" the underlying program and
produces a set of specifications for the development of a new, func-
tionally equivalent or compatible program. The specifications are
carefully drawn bearing in mind the importance of excluding any
copyrightable subject matter (e.g., literal expression, sequence,
structure, or organization) which is not essential to functional com-
patibility. Those specifications are then passed to a second team of
programmers who have never had access to the underlying work
and who develop a new, wholly original program to meet the
specifications.
Since both access and substantial similarity of protected ex-
pression are necessary to establish aprimafacie showing of infringe-
ment (absent direct evidence of copying), one of the essential
elements will be lacking if the authors of the accused work can be
shown never to have had access to the underlying work.
183
Avoid Unnecessary Similarities
Aside from potential utility patent infringement issues, which
183. See NEC Corporation v. Intel Corporation, No. 1409 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
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are beyond the scope of these materials, it is extremely important
when developing competitive or compatible software or documenta-
tion to avoid unnecessary similarity to the underlying work. The
copying or development of derivative works based upon copy-
righted elements not necessary to functional compatibility may re-
sult in a finding of infringement, as may the copying of protected
trade dress or patented designs.
With respect to computer programs, the likelihood of similar-
ity in the final product will be a function of two things; one is the
extent to which literal or structural elements of the underlying work
are incorporated into the new work, and the other is the extent to
which detailed specifications call for the new work to be written in a
certain way. Obviously, if a new work is properly developed in a
"clean room" environment and the specifications are not unduly re-
strictive, such unnecessary similarity will likely be the product of
coincidence or the result of programming convention.
If "clean room" procedures are not available or too costly, it
may be necessary to deliberately write similarly functioning compo-
nents in a manner different from the competitor's program simply
for the sake of avoiding similarity.' 84 Though this may appear to be
a waste of resources, it could minimize the risk of expensive litiga-
tion and the concurrent risk of a judgment against the developer.
Maintain Evidence of Development Efforts
Since the courts often look to whether a defendant has invested
the time and effort which reasonably would have been required to
properly engineer or independently develop its own products, it is
important that procedures be established to maintain proper evi-
dence of the reverse engineering and development effort and the
ways in which information utilized in those efforts is acquired. Rec-
ognizing that this will be done in anticipation of possible litigation,
it is important that such evidence be as detailed and accurate as
possible and that it be preserved in tangible and admissible form.
This may include written policies and procedures pertaining to
the activities to be undertaken, records of how a competitor's hard-
ware, software, documentation or other information have been
properly acquired, steps taken by the developer to ensure that the
process is not tainted by unlawful conduct, lab notebooks, daily
time records of the persons involved in the project, expense records,
184. Id.
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and even video tapes, disks, listings, and other "snapshots" of the
development as it proceeds.
CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, the law does not prohibit one from zer-
oing in on a profitable market segment and offering an alternative
product or service, provided the methods used do not infringe upon
a competitor's intellectual property or other legal rights. Many of
the cases in which courts have awarded damages or injunctive relief
based on findings of infringement or trade secret misappropriation
might have turned out differently if more care had been taken by
the defendant in the early stages of the project to guard against such
exposure. Although each endeavor will raise unique considerations,
the foregoing discussion has identified the principal applicable bod-
ies of intellectual property law and examples of procedures that can
be followed to avoid infringing conduct and minimize the risk that
such development efforts will be found tainted by unlawful conduct.
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